DORA cryptography requirements: what Article 9 and the RTS actually say
DORA’s cryptography requirements sit in two texts. Article 9 of DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) requires key protection and encryption based on data classification and ICT risk assessment. Articles 6 and 7 of the ICT risk-management RTS (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774) require a documented encryption and cryptographic-controls policy, key management across the whole lifecycle, and a register of certificates.
This guide quotes those provisions from the official texts, lists the evidence each one calls for, and is explicit about which parts an inventory of your cryptography can and cannot provide. Sector readings are in our guides for banks and insurers.
Who it applies to, and since when
DORA has applied to EU financial entities since 17 January 2025 (Article 64). RTS 2024/1774, adopted on 13 March 2024, sets out the ICT risk-management detail that Article 15 of DORA asked for, including “cryptographic techniques”.
The RTS has two regimes. Title II, which contains the cryptography articles, applies to most financial entities. Title III is a simplified framework for the entities listed in DORA Article 16(1), such as small and non-interconnected investment firms and some exempted payment and e-money institutions; it has no article dedicated to cryptography.
DORA Article 9: protection and prevention
Article 9 sets the objectives. Under Article 9(2), financial entities must implement ICT security policies, procedures, protocols and tools that maintain “high standards of availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of data, whether at rest, in use or in transit”. Article 9(4)(d) is the one provision of DORA itself that names cryptography:
“implement policies and protocols for strong authentication mechanisms, based on relevant standards and dedicated control systems, and protection measures of cryptographic keys whereby data is encrypted based on results of approved data classification and ICT risk assessment processes”
DORA, Article 9(4)(d)
Two points follow. Encryption is decided by classification and risk assessment, not applied everywhere by default. And keys are named explicitly, so key protection is a supervisory topic in its own right.
RTS Article 6: the encryption and cryptographic-controls policy
Article 6 turns Article 9 into a policy with required content. Financial entities must “develop, document, and implement a policy on encryption and cryptographic controls” (6(1)), designed on the basis of an approved data classification and ICT risk assessment (6(2)). The policy must contain rules for:
- the encryption of data at rest and in transit;
- the encryption of data in use, where necessary (and, where that is not possible, processing in a separated and protected environment or equivalent measures);
- the encryption of internal network connections and traffic with external parties;
- cryptographic key management, as set out in Article 7.
Three further paragraphs matter most in practice:
- 6(3), selection criteria. The policy must include criteria for choosing cryptographic techniques, “taking into account leading practices, and standards” and the classification of the ICT assets concerned.
- 6(4), keeping up with cryptanalysis. The policy must provide for “updating or changing, where necessary, the cryptographic technology on the basis of developments in cryptanalysis”.
- 6(5), documented exceptions. Where an entity cannot follow 6(3) or 6(4), it must adopt mitigation and monitoring measures, record them and give a reasoned explanation.
Article 6(4) is where post-quantum migration enters DORA. The text does not mention quantum computing, but a policy that must provide for changing cryptography as cryptanalysis develops has to say what it does about a known attack on RSA and elliptic curves. Article 6(5) covers the systems that cannot move yet, provided the reason is written down.
RTS Article 7: keys and certificates
Article 7 covers the full key lifecycle: “generating, renewing, storing, backing up, archiving, retrieving, transmitting, retiring, revoking, and destroying” (7(1)), with controls against “loss, unauthorised access, disclosure, and modification” (7(2)) and methods to replace keys that are lost, compromised or damaged (7(3)).
It also contains the most concrete record-keeping duty in the cryptography articles:
“Financial entities shall create and maintain a register for all certificates and certificate-storing devices for at least ICT assets supporting critical or important functions. Financial entities shall keep that register up to date.”
RTS 2024/1774, Article 7(4)
Article 7(5) adds prompt renewal of certificates before they expire. A register maintained by hand rarely stays current; one regenerated from scans of certificate stores and live endpoints can.
Article 13(e) of the RTS completes the picture for networks: the encryption of network connections over corporate, public, domestic, third-party and wireless networks, again based on classification and risk assessment.
Provision by provision: the evidence to prepare
The table maps each provision to the evidence a review is likely to look for, and to what an automated inventory of your code, certificates and TLS endpoints can contribute. The last column is deliberately narrow: an inventory records what cryptography exists and where; it does not replace policies, procedures or key-management controls.
| Provision | What it requires | Evidence to prepare | What an inventory contributes |
|---|---|---|---|
| DORA Art. 8(1) | Identify, classify and adequately document information assets and ICT assets and their dependencies; review at least yearly. | An asset inventory in which the cryptography protecting each critical asset is visible. | Cryptographic assets per system, with file, line or endpoint. |
| DORA Art. 9(2) | Maintain high standards of availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of data, “whether at rest, in use or in transit”. | A mapping of data classes to the controls, including cryptography, that protect them. | Which algorithms protect which flows and stores. |
| DORA Art. 9(4)(d) | Strong authentication, and “protection measures of cryptographic keys whereby data is encrypted based on results of approved data classification and ICT risk assessment processes”. | Key-protection controls, and encryption decisions traced to classification. | Key sizes and curves in use, located. |
| RTS Art. 6(1)–(2) | A documented policy on encryption and cryptographic controls, based on data classification and ICT risk assessment, with rules for data at rest, in transit, in use where necessary, internal and external network traffic, and key management. | The policy, and proof it is applied. | The current state the policy is checked against. |
| RTS Art. 6(3) | Criteria for selecting cryptographic techniques, taking into account leading practices, standards and the classification of ICT assets; mitigation and monitoring where you cannot follow them. | Approved and deprecated algorithm lists; exceptions with their mitigations. | Uses of deprecated algorithms (MD5, SHA-1, RSA-1024), located. |
| RTS Art. 6(4) | Provisions for “updating or changing, where necessary, the cryptographic technology on the basis of developments in cryptanalysis”; mitigation and monitoring where you cannot. | How cryptanalysis is monitored, what triggers a change, and the migration plan. | The quantum-vulnerable assets (RSA, ECDSA, ECDH) a migration must cover. |
| RTS Art. 6(5) | Record the mitigation and monitoring measures adopted under 6(3) and 6(4), with a reasoned explanation. | An exceptions register with reasons, owners and review dates. | The list of assets each exception covers. |
| RTS Art. 7(1)–(3) | Manage keys through their whole lifecycle (generation to destruction), protect them against loss, unauthorised access, disclosure and modification, and be able to replace lost or compromised keys. | Key-management procedures, HSM and KMS configuration, replacement runbooks. | Partial: certificates and the key sizes in use. Key-management procedures are process controls a scan cannot see. |
| RTS Art. 7(4)–(5) | A register of all certificates and certificate-storing devices, for at least ICT assets supporting critical or important functions, kept up to date; prompt renewal before expiry. | The certificate register and the renewal process. | Certificates with issuer, validity and signature algorithm, from files, stores and live TLS endpoints. |
| RTS Art. 13(e) | Encryption of network connections over corporate, public, domestic, third-party and wireless networks, based on data classification and risk assessment. | Protocol and cipher-suite standards per network zone. | Negotiated TLS protocols and cipher suites per endpoint. |
The supervisor’s questions follow from this table: show the policy and how it follows from classification; show where cryptography is used for critical or important functions; show the certificate register; explain how developments in cryptanalysis are tracked and what was decided; show the documented exceptions.
Why the inventory comes first
Every provision above assumes a map nobody has by default: which algorithms, key sizes and certificates protect which systems, which are already weak (MD5, SHA-1, RSA-1024), and which are quantum-vulnerable (RSA, ECDSA, ECDH) while protecting data that must stay confidential for years. Without it, a policy under Article 6 cannot be checked against reality, a register under Article 7(4) cannot be complete, and exceptions under Article 6(5) cannot be listed.
A Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM) in CycloneDX 1.6 is the standard way to record that map: machine-readable, vendor-neutral, and accepted by GRC tooling. The same inventory serves NIS2 Article 21, the EU Cyber Resilience Act and the EU post-quantum roadmap, which lists cryptographic inventories among the first steps due by the end of 2026.
Where CRYPTAGION fits, and where it does not
CRYPTAGION builds the inventory part of this evidence. It discovers cryptography in Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Go and C/C++ source code, X.509 certificates and live TLS endpoints, records the file and line or endpoint of every finding, scores each asset by quantum risk and harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure, and exports a schema-validated CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM with a PDF report mapped to DORA, NIS2 and the CRA. It runs on-premises or air-gapped.
It does not write your policy, run your key management or see cryptography configured inside HSMs, and it does not yet scan binaries or container images. Those parts of Article 7 need procedures, supplier disclosure and manual review. Using CRYPTAGION supports compliance activities; it does not by itself establish compliance.
Frequently asked questions
Does DORA require encryption?
Not as a blanket rule. DORA Article 9(4)(d) requires protection measures for cryptographic keys “whereby data is encrypted based on results of approved data classification and ICT risk assessment processes”. RTS Article 6(2) then requires a policy with rules for encrypting data at rest and in transit, data in use where necessary, and internal network connections and traffic with external parties. What you encrypt follows from your classification and risk assessment, and the policy has to say so.
Does DORA require a cryptographic inventory?
Not by that name. DORA Article 8(1) requires financial entities to identify, classify and document their information assets and ICT assets, RTS Article 6(3) ties the choice of cryptographic techniques to that classification, and RTS Article 7(4) requires a register of certificates and certificate-storing devices. In our reading, you cannot evidence those three without knowing where your cryptography is, which is what an inventory records.
Does DORA mention post-quantum cryptography?
No. Neither DORA nor RTS 2024/1774 names quantum computing or post-quantum algorithms. RTS Article 6(4) requires the policy to provide for “updating or changing, where necessary, the cryptographic technology on the basis of developments in cryptanalysis”. In our reading, Shor’s algorithm against RSA and elliptic curves is such a development, which makes post-quantum migration a matter for that clause.
What if a legacy system cannot be changed?
RTS Article 6(3) and 6(4) both allow for it: entities that cannot follow leading practices and standards, or cannot update their cryptographic technology, “shall adopt mitigation and monitoring measures that ensure resilience against cyber threats”. Article 6(5) adds that the policy must require you to record those measures and give a reasoned explanation. An exception is acceptable; an undocumented one is not.
Which financial entities are outside these rules?
Entities listed in DORA Article 16(1), such as small and non-interconnected investment firms and some exempted payment and e-money institutions, are outside Articles 5 to 15 of DORA and follow a simplified ICT risk-management framework instead. That framework, in Title III of RTS 2024/1774, has no article dedicated to cryptography. All other financial entities in scope of DORA follow Title II, which contains Articles 6 and 7.
Since when do these requirements apply?
DORA applies from 17 January 2025 (Article 64). RTS 2024/1774, adopted on 13 March 2024, supplements it.
Sources
- Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), Articles 8, 9, 15, 16 and 64
- Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774 (ICT risk-management RTS), Articles 6, 7 and 13, and Title III
Quotations are from the English versions published on EUR-Lex.
See the inventory on real code
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Request a free demo →This page reflects a practitioner reading of DORA and RTS 2024/1774; it is not legal advice. Confirm obligations with your compliance and legal teams.